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Extreme weather causes substantial adverse socio-economic impacts by damaging and
disrupting the infrastructure services that underpin modern society. Globally, $2.5tn a year
is spent on infrastructure which is typically designed to last decades, over which period
projected changes in the climate will modify infrastructure performance. A systems approach
has been developed to assess risks across all infrastructure sectors to guide national policy
making and adaptation investment. The method analyses diverse evidence of climate risks and
adaptation actions, to assess the urgency and extent of adaptation required. Application to the
UK shows that despite recent adaptation efforts, risks to infrastructure outweigh opportunities.
Flooding is the greatest risk to all infrastructure sectors: even if the Paris Agreement to limit
global warming to 2°C is achieved, the number of users reliant on electricity infrastructure
at risk of flooding would double, while a 4°C rise could triple UK flood damage. Other
risks are significant, for example 5% and 20% of river catchments would be unable to meet
water demand with 2°C and 4°C global warming respectively. Increased interdependence
between infrastructure systems, especially from energy and information and communication
technology (ICT), are amplifying risks, but adaptation action is limited by lack of clear
responsibilities. A programme to build national capability is urgently required to improve
infrastructure risk assessment.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘Advances in risk assessment for climate change
adaptation policy’.
1. Introduction
Infrastructure provides the critical services such as heating, lighting, mobility and sanitation
that are essential for modern society. The current variability in climate already compromises
infrastructure performance, and disruption or complete failure of these services causes significant
adverse social, economic and environmental impacts. For example, inundation of water treatment
plants and electricity distribution substations left hundreds of thousands of people without power
and water in southwest England [1]. In 2012, Hurricane Sandy caused substantial damage to New
York’s infrastructure networks; however, loss of the services these networks provided magnified
other economic losses and also hampered recovery efforts [2]. During the winter of 2013/14,
storms in the UK led to loss of power for over 150 000 homes for significant periods of time,
closure of Gatwick Airport, disruption of rail/road travel including complete severance of the
South Devon Main Line in Devon for two months, in addition to general damage to buildings
and to other infrastructure assets [3]. A year later, more floods disrupted electricity supplies for
tens of thousands of people, caused the failure of a number of bridges, and disrupted mobile
and broadband communication networks [4]. The importance of infrastructure and the significant
impacts from its disruption are echoed in other extreme weather events around the world [5,6,7].
Climate change will alter average weather conditions and the nature of extreme weather in
the UK and globally [8]. Gradual shifts in long-term trends (e.g. a rise in average temperatures)
will reduce the capacity and efficiency of some infrastructure. This will be compounded by
increases in the frequency of severe weather events, such as flooding, which will lead to increased
disruption of infrastructure. Climate change can thereby alter the design life of infrastructure
and the effectiveness of the services it provides. Globally, $2.5tn a year is currently spent on
infrastructure [9]. In the UK alone, the National Infrastructure Plan [10] sets out £300 billion
of planned investment across all sectors of infrastructure by 2020/21. Infrastructure is typically
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associated with large capital costs and with lifespans of 30–200 years. Furthermore, there is
limited flexibility once built. Overall, given the sensitivity of infrastructure performance to climate
and that decisions on design and renovation have long-lasting implications which are hard to
reverse, assessing the climate risks to infrastructure must therefore be a priority. To avoid longer
term impacts on people and the economy, it is essential that future infrastructure investments, as
well as the adaptation of existing infrastructure, are made in the context of these risks.
National assessments typically consider a broad range of climate change impacts (table 1),
including water, transport and energy infrastructure sectors, but usually have only limited or
no consideration of climate risks to solid waste, information and communication technology
(ICT), flood and coastal protection infrastructure. Almost all the national assessments studied
assess risks on the basis of published evidence, and while this is summarized in different ways,
very few assessments prioritize and rank the risks identified, even in relative terms. In the
UK, the 2008 Climate Change Act requires a national climate change risk assessment every
5 years. As a result, the first UK Climate Change Risk Assessment [11] was completed in 2012
and took the approach of constructing a series of quantitative response functions that related
climate variables (e.g. sea-level rise) to risk (e.g. coastal flood risk) across a number of sectors.
The approach developed here, and subsequently applied in the second UK Climate Change Risk
Assessment [12], does not seek to replicate the detailed analysis of the first, but instead uses it
as a starting point for a systematic review and assessment of new evidence of current and future
risks to infrastructure. The methodology is introduced in §2, and its application to assess risks
to UK infrastructure reported in §3. The paper concludes with discussion about the key findings,
efficacy of the approach especially in comparison to the first UK assessment, and uncertainties and
recommendations for future development of methods for national assessment of climate change
risks to infrastructure.
2. A framework for climate risk assessment of national infrastructure
Climate change risk assessment of infrastructure needs to consider a wide range of current and
possible future climatic conditions, their related risks and opportunities for infrastructure sectors,
and the extent to which current or planned policies and proposals will manage them.
(a) A systems view of infrastructure
An infrastructure risk assessment must consider more than just impacts to physical components
and assets such as tracks, pipes and wires. It is crucial to consider the resources that these physical
components move about, and the services they provide that the public and businesses depend
upon. Furthermore, these systems are all interconnected. Increasingly, infrastructure depends on
other infrastructure to work, not just technically, but also socially and economically.
A risk assessment must therefore take a systems view of infrastructure that requires
consideration of a number of key elements beyond just the obvious physical assets (figure 1).
Infrastructure plays an important role in modulating both the use of natural environment resources
that is directly affected by climate change, for example water resources, but also for mitigating
environmental hazards, such as hydrological extremes, that perpetrate climate risks. Individual
physical assets interconnect to provide a network that joins locations demanding a particular
resource or service, with areas that can supply it. The resources conveyed by infrastructure include
vehicles, water, electricity and data as well as the materials used in infrastructure construction
which enable services such as warmth, mobility, sanitation, transportation, and communication
that benefit a wide range of individual, business, or other users. These are all influenced by an
array of actors, institutions, regulation, protocols and processes that have influence over all parts of
the infrastructure system. Climate change can impact directly the different constituent elements
of the infrastructure system, while actions taken to manage climate risks may be implemented
across any of these elements.
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Figure 1. Conceptual view of infrastructure as a system (from [20]). (Online version in colour.)
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Figure 2. A systems approach to a climate change risk assessment framework for infrastructure, with some indicative variables
or risks at each assessment stage (from [20]). (Online version in colour.)
(b) Systems risk assessment of infrastructure
A systems approach to climate change risk assessment of infrastructure has therefore been
developed that comprises a number of stages (figure 2).
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(i) Analysis of climate variables (e.g. rainfall, temperature and wind) to understand change
over time, and how the frequency and magnitude of hazards such as floods or heat waves
will subsequently be altered. The climate change context used in the 2017 UK Climate
Change Risk Assessment is summarized in [21,22].
(ii) Characterization of each infrastructure asset, in particular its fragility and capacity, to
understand its response to extreme events and changes in climate. Typically, climate
loadings of larger magnitude or wider spatial coverage increase the likelihood of failure
or lead to greater reduction of performance of individual assets, and consequently the
impacts of failure.
(iii) Analysis of network-wide effects that occur as a result of impacts on individual or
multiple components and system functions. Typically, higher climate loadings, and
events that directly impact more of the network, lead to increased impacts. However,
the magnitude of impacts is also mediated by network properties such as the number of
backup or redundant components.
(iv) Analysis of interactions and interdependencies between infrastructure networks to
understand cascading impacts.
(v) Assessment of systemic risks that are related to the loss of infrastructure services
that consequently lead to indirect impacts on economic growth, social wellbeing and
environmental protection. These broader interactions are considered in [23].
(vi) Adaptations may be implemented across the infrastructure system. This may involve
asset- or network-scale engineering, policy or regulatory interventions, or working with
users to manage demand for services.
The significance of a risk depends on the combination of the likelihood of a climatic
event and its impacts. The magnitude of impacts is often mediated by asset characteristics,
including fragility, capacity and redundancy. They are further mediated by the capacity and
vulnerability of organizations and users affected. Low likelihood, high impact events require
different management to more frequent, low impact events. In particular, the lowest probability
events require special attention in terms of warning and community preparedness as it may
not be possible to identify the hazards, let alone protect against them. A climate change
risk assessment should therefore consider a full range of loadings, impacts and possible
responses.
Infrastructure adaptation options can be compared on the basis of the impact that they are
expected to have on reducing the frequency and severity of climate effects. There are four main
strategies to manage climate change risks to infrastructure.
(i) Reduce the likelihood of infrastructure component failure by providing enhanced
protection.
(ii) Improve the performance of infrastructure components so they are able to operate under
a wider range of climatic conditions.
(iii) Provide redundancy to increase the capacity, number of alternative connections and
diversity of components and backup systems.
(iv) Build capacity in organizations and communities, and via technological advancement, to
deliver a fast and effective response to, and recovery from, climate disruption.
In a systems assessment, climate change adaptation is not limited to ‘major’ engineering
options, but a wider set of interventions across the whole infrastructure system at a range of
temporal and spatial scales. Adaptations include technical options but also regulatory, policy
and community responses are crucial to enhancing the adaptive capacity (potential to adapt to
climate variability and change) of infrastructure systems. However, much of the evidence of
adaptation activity for UK infrastructure focuses on engineering responses, as the benefits of these
are typically easier to assess quantitatively.
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Figure 3. Key relationships between climate hazards and each infrastructure sector. A light shade denotes a relationship exists,
a darker shade denotes the relationship is strong. Dependencies between infrastructures are not shown here.
(c) Evidence assessment
The first stage of the risk assessment is to identify where there are causal relationships between
infrastructure sectors and individual climate hazards (figure 3), which might be altered as a result
of climate change.
Models and quantitative evidence exist for some of the aspects of the systems risk assessment
framework in figure 2, but information on climate risks to infrastructure is recorded in a variety
of formats and in a wide range of papers, reports and other material. Furthermore, the quality of
the evidence base is extremely variable across the many infrastructure sectors, individual assets
and their interdependencies. In the absence of individual models, or even national scale models
for all the individual sectors, available evidence was analysed using the framework set out by
Warren [21] to answer three questions:
1. What is the current and future level of climate risk to infrastructure?
2. To what extent are these risks going to be managed, and what is the subsequent residual
risk, taking into account adaptation commitments and autonomous adaptation?
3. Are there benefits of further action in the next 5 years?
In each case the quality of the evidence was considered to determine the level of uncertainty
(low, medium or high confidence) in the assessment. Subsequently, and taking into account
reported adaptation actions, an assessment was conducted about the urgency and type of
adaptation action required over the next 5 years to manage these long-term risks.
In all, 309 sources of evidence [20] were reviewed and used to identify priority risks in the
present day and under future climatic and socio-economic conditions. An initial assessment
was made by the authors, before submitting it to two external reviews by stakeholders from
over 30 academic, government and non-government organizations, as well as infrastructure
utility companies and consultancies. Over 650 comments were received as part of this review
process which led to several refinements as assumptions and expert judgements incorporated
new evidence [24]. An assessment of the urgency of climate change risks to infrastructure
is summarized in table 2. Key contributions from the evidence base are summarized in
the following sections, and the rationale is described in full by the Committee on Climate
Change [25].
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3. Climate change risks to the UK’s infrastructure
Each infrastructure sector faces a number of climate risks, the magnitude of which is modulated
by specific geographical or engineering features. The most significant risks for UK infrastructure
are identified and summarized according to climate risk in the following sections, and by sector
in figure 4. The main opportunity identified is a reduced frequency, although not cessation,
of extreme cold events that impact upon water, transport, digital and energy infrastructure.
However, reduced frequency of severe events can increase vulnerability to individual extreme
events if the capacity to cope is reduced, as occurred during the particularly cold Winter
2010/11 [26].
(a) Flood damage and disruption
Flooding is the most significant climate change risk to UK infrastructure, affecting all
infrastructure sectors. A significant number of infrastructure assets are already situated in
locations that are exposed to river, coastal, groundwater or surface water flooding. Flooding of
infrastructure can lead to lengthy disruption and high repair costs. Table 3 shows that a significant
proportion of infrastructure has been found to be at risk of flooding from multiple sources [27].
Flood risk from river, coastal, pluvial and groundwater sources is projected to increase across
the UK, even after accounting for the most ambitious adaptation plans by national and local
authorities. Under a scenario of 4°C of global warming by the 2080s, the number of assets exposed
could double. For example, currently some 2400 km of the UK rail network is vulnerable to
flooding and this could rise by 120% by the 2080s [27]. More intense rainfall associated with this
scenario will also increase the frequency of sewer flooding and combined sewer overflow events.
Infrastructure networks near rivers will be at risk from projected higher flows and subsequent
river bank erosion. Bridges are especially vulnerable: historically the annual probability of
observing a flood event in which one or more railway bridges fails is 1 in 2.6 years (annual
exceedance probability, AEP = 0.390) [28]. Projected changes to winter river flows would increase
scour by over 8% at 1 in 20 of all the 4239 railway and 8664 main road bridges, placing them at
high risk of failure by 2080 [29].
Coastal infrastructure is particularly at risk from storm surges and rising sea levels, as well as
increased rates of coastal erosion in some locations. Rising sea levels of 0.5–1 m by the end of the
century will increase the proportion of assets vulnerable to coastal flooding, as well as increasing
rates of coastal erosion in some locations. The annual cost of maintenance of coastal defence could
increase by 150–400% [30].
(b) Droughts and reduced water availability
The UK currently has an overall surplus of water availability, of approximately 2000 ml/day.
However, supply and demand are finely balanced in many catchments. In the absence of further
adaptations, by the 2050s, a high population growth and high climate change scenarios will see
widespread deficits which will be largest in south-east England and the conjunctive use zones in
the north of England [31]. Extended periods of low rainfall, and associated low river flows and
groundwater levels, will reduce the availability of water resources, both for consumption but also
for freshwater abstractions to cool power plants.
(c) Storm damage and disruption
Overhead cables used for energy distribution, electrified rail and some ICT networks such as
those delivering broadband to rural areas are vulnerable to lightning strikes, high winds and
tree- and debris-related damage associated with storms. There is broad uncertainty surrounding
climate projections for wind, but lightning strike disruptions to the energy network may increase
between 4–36% within different regions by the 2080s under a 3°C climate scenario [32], with a
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Figure 4. Relationship between global temperature change relative to pre-industrial era, and some of the key climate change
risks to UK infrastructure. A high risk of flooding has a likelihood of flooding more frequently than 1 in 75 years (AEP≥ 0.013).
The assessment of global change risks is taken from [12]. (Online version in colour.)
Table 3. Percentage of some infrastructure assets at risk from different sources of flooding.
source of flooding
river or coastal surface water groundwater
power stations 41 6 18
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
railway track 17 9 17
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
railway stations 14 3 16
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
motorways and A-roads 9 6 9
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
clean water and wastewater treatment plants 33 12 24
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
similar increase in the incidence of damage to mobile phone base stations. The impact of such
events is relatively low, compared to events such as flooding, as damage can usually be repaired
comparatively quickly and services rapidly restored.
(d) Geohazards (including subsidence and landslides)
Extended periods of rainfall increase slope and embankment instability. This risk is most
significant for road and rail infrastructure, where nearly 2% of the UK’s network is at high risk
of landslide disruption and a further 6% at medium risk [29]. On average, 50 landslides per year
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disrupt rail services, although over the winter of 2013/14 there were 105 earthwork failures on
the rail network alone [33]. The site-specific characteristics of slopes and embankments makes it
especially difficult to take a proactive approach to adaptation.
Subsidence due to shrink–swell processes, and desiccation-cracking with associated reduction
in stability, is driven by cycles of drought and heavy rain [34]. This can damage railway track, road
surfaces and buried infrastructure such as waste and water pipes. Risks are most significant in
areas where shrink–swell susceptible clay soils dominate, especially around London and the east
of England. The impact of climate change on persistent rainfall events is also uncertain, but recent
prolonged periods of rainfall have acted as triggers for geohazards, for example the M3 motorway
was closed for two days during the 2013/14 winter storms following the sudden appearance of a
sinkhole [35].
(e) High temperatures
Railways, ICT and electricity generation, transmission and distribution infrastructure are all
susceptible to extremes in temperature. The 2003 heat wave cost £2.5 million in repairs to the
rail network, and the frequency of rail buckling events is expected to be four times higher under
a 2°C climate change scenario [36]. Track can be pre-tensioned to suit prevailing temperatures but
the greater range of high and low temperatures likely to be experienced over a year may cause
operational difficulties.
Increases in air and water temperatures affect the output and efficiency of steam and gas
turbine-based generators. This would also decrease the effective capacity of electricity networks
by reducing the average rating of overhead lines in the distribution network by 6–10% by
the 2080s for the 4°C climate scenario, although the reduction could be up to 27% for some
components [37,38]. However, reductions in performance are smaller than recent historical load
growth which has typically been 1.5–2% per annum [37].
(f) Infrastructure interdependencies
Infrastructures are increasingly dependent on each other—for power, control (via ICT) and access
for deliveries or servicing. Moreover, a range of other mechanisms can create interdependencies
that impact upon climate risks [39]. All UK infrastructure sectors have identified failure of another
infrastructure sector as a risk to their own networks [40]. However, despite efforts in recent
years to encourage infrastructure operators to work together and address vulnerabilities [41],
there is usually insufficient information to fully appraise the risks between systems. There is
presently no formalized framework for engagement and collaborative working which, when
coupled with commercial and security sensitivities, remain barriers to routine data sharing and
cooperation. In this assessment, five dependency risks were identified as especially sensitive to
climate change risks.
(i) Dependence on water infrastructure
The UK’s current national energy generation mix requires significant volumes of water for
cooling, and 23% of the UK’s energy is generated by power plants cooled from freshwater
sources [42]. Inland power generation in England is most vulnerable to reduced water availability
[43]. Water demand for cooling is influenced by the electricity generation mix, decarbonization
strategies that involve high levels of carbon capture and storage could double freshwater
consumption by the 2050s [44]. Even with no climate change impacts the projected growth of
cooling water abstractions could reach the current licensed abstraction limit in some catchments
by the 2040s [45]. This would compound the drought risk described previously which did not
consider electricity generation mix.
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(ii) Dependence on power infrastructure
All infrastructure sectors require power for some, if not all, of their assets. Analysis of the
impact of a 1 in 1000 year flood (AEP = 0.001) in the Thames catchment showed approximately
12 million people rely on power infrastructure within the floodplain [46]. Moreover, loss
of this power infrastructure could disrupt wastewater treatment infrastructure serving over
7 million people, water supply infrastructure serving over 10 million and telecommunications
infrastructure serving over 9 million. Although this analysis did not have information on
the level of flood protection of individual assets, it highlights the importance of electricity
infrastructure in supporting other sectors. Current trends in energy infrastructure, such as
uptake of electric vehicles and the electrification of railway lines, and decentralization of energy
systems, will alter the nature of these risks although there is limited evidence of the long-term
implications.
(iii) Dependence on information and communication technology infrastructure
Modern infrastructure is increasingly reliant on ICT for monitoring, remote operation, clock
synchronization, and coordination of emergency response during extreme events. For example,
the loss of power to an Internet hub in Italy led to failure of other power stations disrupting
56 million people across Italy and Switzerland [47]. There has been no comparable event in
the UK, but during the 2015/16 winter floods in York damaged assets supporting wired and
wireless ICT networks, causing loss of banking, broadband and emergency services at distances
of up to 100 km away [48]. Insufficient data about the location of ICT assets and their role in
managing other infrastructure sectors has hindered comprehensive analysis. However, ICT has
been shown to be the second most important infrastructure network for the operation of the UK’s
rail network; for example, flooding of the 7% of assets in the low flood risk (less than 1 in 200 year
likelihood of flooding) would disrupt 46% of passenger journeys [49]. Although there is limited
available data about assets and adaptation actions, it is known that ICT is increasingly important
to the operation of all other infrastructure networks, and it has been shown that this increased
interdependency would also increase the risk of cascading failure across the entire infrastructure
system and beyond [47,50].
(iv) Dependence on transport infrastructure
Infrastructure networks are often dependent on transport infrastructure for continued operation,
for example to ensure access for resources such as fuel, personnel and emergency response.
Failure of key infrastructure components such as bridges, or landslides that block important
transport corridors, can significantly increase travel times as a result of rerouting of journeys
[51]. Loss of the only road bridge in Workington in 2009 required residents to make a two-hour
journey to reach the other side of the river causing significant local social and economic impacts
[52]. A 1 in 200 year (AEP = 0.005) flood event in Newcastle-upon-Tyne would block multiple
roads simultaneously, and during peak travel time this would cause disruption equivalent to 1000
passenger days [53]. Analysis of a 1 in 200 year flood event on key fuel and food depots in the
Shetland Islands, shows that the subsequent disruption to supply chains could lead to depletion
of stocks across the region within a few days, echoing observations in New York after hurricane
Sandy [54].
(v) Geographical dependence
Co-sited cables, fibre optics, road, railway, pipe and other infrastructure—even if not physically
connected but running in parallel along the same route—can amplify climate risks as a single
event can disrupt multiple services unless assets are designed to interoperate [55]. Limited
information on these risks exists, but using best available data hotspots of geographical
infrastructure interdependence across England and Wales have been identified [56]. These
hotspots reflect the number of users directly or indirectly dependent on all infrastructure in
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any given location. Unsurprisingly, large population centres are shown to be concentrations of
interdependencies, but less intuitively many hotspots are in the urban periphery areas as critical
assets are usually not located in city centres, while critical infrastructure ‘corridors’ that span the
country are also revealed, highlighting the risk to disruption of multiple services from a large
scale event [56].
4. Discussion
(a) Balancing detail and scope in national risk assessment
This analysis, undertaken as part of the second UK Climate Change Risk Assessment, had
a wider scope than other national assessments (table 1) as it included a broader analysis
of risks to other sectors such as solid waste, ICT, flood and coastal erosion infrastructure.
Furthermore, it considered all infrastructures together, including assessment of a number
of risks resulting from infrastructure interdependence. In the 5 years since the first [11]
assessment there has been improved analysis of risks from flooding, bridge scour, rail buckling,
windstorms and interdependencies. Although the results are not comparable in absolute terms,
no manifest change in the trends of key risks was identified, and the risks still outweigh the
opportunities.
The methodology used in this national scale assessment allows integration of evidence in a
consistent way, is more appropriate for handling uncertainties, and can incorporate qualitative
evidence that is ill-suited to more quantitative modelling exercises. However, by only relying on,
and interpreting, existing evidence there is limited opportunity for learning from new analysis;
although it does afford the opportunity to identify knowledge gaps where extra analysis is
required. The classification of urgency used here was tailored to support development of a
National Adaptation Plan mandated by the UK Climate Change Act; however, the principle of
translating risk information into a recommendation for action is useful as it provides a direct link
between the assessment and policy requirements.
(b) Consistency of climate risk management information
This analysis reviewed a large body of evidence, which revealed enormous diversity in
methodologies, quality and completeness of information analysed. Studies have used a wide
range of different scenarios, spatial scales, timeframes and impact metrics to assess risks. The
majority of evidence is compiled from observations or sub-national analyses, with only a small
proportion of the evidence providing a national-scale assessment of infrastructure risks. However,
many national scale studies are reliant on the same underpinning datasets (e.g. the Environment
Agency’s NaFRA data layer provides a national flood depth-probability map [57]). Furthermore,
evidence is not evenly distributed across the range of climate risks to infrastructure. While there is
an abundance of material on flood risks, and to a lesser extent on drought risks, a comprehensive
national assessment of slope stability risk currently defies analysis because of the sensitivity of
asset performance to very specific local conditions.
Across the UK’s infrastructure sectors there are a wide range of approaches to infrastructure
governance, regulation, data collection and data accessibility. Some infrastructures like roads
are in the public sector (though sometimes privately operated) while others, like telecoms and
England’s water industry, are in the private sector; for railways a hybrid ownership approach
exists. This poses challenges for risk assessment, but especially when considering the risk
reduction benefits of adaptation because measures are reported inconsistently, and in many
cases not recorded at all. This lack of standardization and incomplete availability of data has
posed a significant challenge for this assessment, and highlights a current lack of a systematic
approach to understanding climate risks on infrastructure. There are good reasons to encourage
diversity in the data and methods to build the evidence basis for climate change risk assessment,
this can ensure a broader set of insights, but avoids too much correlation and overlap in the
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evidence base. However, a shared and open approach to recording the metadata associated
with key attributes of the evidence (e.g. geography; timeframes; scenarios; recording adaptation
measures) is strongly recommended as this would greatly facilitate the assimilation of risk
information.
(c) Significant knowledge gaps
A number of significant uncertainties, beyond consistency of reporting, and gaps in our
understanding of infrastructure risks have been identified that should be addressed by more
fundamental research.
The impact of climate change on wind, lightning, offshore waves and currents, and sub-
hourly rainfall intensity, is highly uncertain. However, there is a direct relationship between
these weather processes and infrastructure risks, especially for assets designed for a long lifespan.
Developments in high-resolution modelling of convective storms [58] may be able to reduce the
uncertainties related to these risks.
Infrastructure performance, including deterioration over the long-term and incidents of
failure, is poorly recorded. Given the long lifespan of many assets and the timeframes over
which climate change manifests, this is a significant uncertainty in risk assessment. More
comprehensive laboratory and long-term field research, as exemplified by [59], are required
to improve understanding of long-term infrastructure deterioration and failure processes. This
must be complemented by a more exhaustive, consistent, and forensic approach by infrastructure
stakeholders to recording and analysing the limited sample of infrastructure failures.
Interconnections and dependencies between infrastructure systems are already important. The
impact of cascading failures across infrastructures has shown that it can be enormous, but even
for smaller scale events these interactions can compound impacts. Furthermore, infrastructure
is increasingly reliant on international connections, whether physical asset connections between
countries, or movement of resources to operate infrastructure services. Methods to enable these
risks to be analysed are emerging [39,60] but in-depth understanding of these risks and the modes
by which failure is transmitted, remain poor and requires greater study. This knowledge gap
is greatest for those interdependencies related to ICT, where analysis is hampered by limited
knowledge of the location of assets and the logical operation of these systems. As infrastructure
becomes increasingly interdependent, with ICT having the most critical role in the ‘smartening’
of infrastructure and cities, it is increasingly important to understand these risks.
5. Conclusion
Infrastructure merits specific consideration in climate change risk assessment, and due to
increased interdependency, the multiple infrastructure sectors warrant collective consideration.
A systems framework for national scale climate change risk assessment for infrastructure has
therefore been developed and used to analyse over 300 sources of data to prioritize adaptation
actions for the UK’s infrastructure. The assessment shows that infrastructure in the UK is already
experiencing significant impacts as a result of the natural variability of our climate. Projected
changes in climate will reduce the life expectancy of existing infrastructure and the effectiveness
of the services it provides. These risks far outweigh potential opportunities, such as reduced
cold-related disruption, associated with climate change. Furthermore, climate change will interact
with, and exacerbate, the impact of other pressures that include population growth and ageing
infrastructure.
There is evidence that significant adaptation steps to manage climate change risks have been
implemented, or are underway, across most infrastructure sectors. Where sufficient information
is available to assess their effectiveness, these adaptation investments will maintain, or in some
instances reduce, climate risks over the next decade or two. However, beyond this projected
changes in climate are likely to outpace current adaptation plans.
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While understanding of risks to individual infrastructure sectors has improved, the
impacts of climate change are expected to be amplified by interconnectivities and
interdependencies between these sectors. Understanding of these is less comprehensive, and
current governance arrangements mean that responsibilities for assessing and managing risks
from interdependencies are unclear. This remains an area of priority for future research.
The method presented here for assessing climate change risks to national infrastructure
is appropriate given the limited availability, and substantial variation, of evidence and tools
to support a national scale assessment. However, given the importance of infrastructure to
the functioning of a modern society, there is a need to enhance capabilities in infrastructure
climate change risk assessment. A starting point will be agreement of a common baseline, some
standardized socio-economic and adaptation scenarios to provide common reference points (but
not limit development of other scenarios), and improved records and metadata about adaptation
actions. However, to fully tackle the issues described in the discussion, a national capability
needs to go further and must ultimately provide a common and internally coherent analytical
framework that enables different risks to be fairly compared. It must be able to analyse the impact
of ‘persistent’ events (e.g. repeated sequence of storms or floods, in the same or multiple locations)
and simultaneous hazards (e.g. wind storm coupled with flooding). This can only be achieved
by producing a national database of the location, function, design and condition of assets, and
a record of any adaptation to these assets in order to provide a reliable assessment of current
and future infrastructure performance. This work has highlighted that there is a substantial body
of work that can be built upon, however, research and development is currently disjointed and
hampered by a lack of sustained investment.
Data accessibility. Evidence and information compiled as part of the 2017 UK Climate Change Risk
Assessment can be accessed here: www.theccc.org.uk/tackling-climate-change/preparing-for-climate-
change/uk-climate-change-risk-assessment-2017/ The full reference list of material incorporated into the
infrastructure section of the 2017 UK Climate Change Risk Assessment is provided in that chapter: Dawson
RJ et al. 2016 Infrastructure. In UK Climate Change Risk Assessment Evidence Report, chapter 4. Report prepared
for the Adaptation Sub-Committee of the Committee on Climate Change, London.
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